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Conclusion
There is a very practical solution to this problem, which does not
offend the principles of joint tenancy, permits joint tenants to mort-
gage their interests with assurance to their creditors that the lien will
not be defeated by.the right of survivorship, and does not destroy
the right of survivorship through severance. This solution is based
on the temporary suspension of the joint tenancy which has been
recognized by the courts.
If the mortgage were conceived to merely suspend the joint
tenancy at the time of the execution of the mortgage, it would be
revived by the redemption of the mortgage and there would be no
destruction of the unities of joint tenancy. The right of survivorship
could not defeat the mortgage lien because it would be inoperative
to pass the interest of the deceased to the survivor until the mortgage
had been redeemed, to the extent of the interest of the joint tenant
mortgagor. This solution permits the non-mortgaging joint tenant, if
he is the survivor, to obtain the complete interest, if he so desires,
by satisfying the mortgage to the extent of the deceased's interest,
but does not deprive him completely of his right of survivorship as
would a complete severance. The mortgaging joint tenant would not
be deprived of his right of survivorship, if he is the survivor, and the
deceased cotenant has chosen not to defeat that right by severance
of the joint tenancy. Neither of the joint tenants are deprived of the
right of survivorship as they would be by complete severance, in the
event the mortgage is satisfied during both of their lifetimes, since
upon redemption of the mortgage the joint tenancy is revived ex-
actly as it was prior to the execution of the mortgage. The greatest
advantage of such a solution would be that joint tenants would be
able to freely exercise a valuable property right, that of mortgaging
their respective interests to secure their debts.
William A. Logan
CGnvnNAL LAw-HABrrUAL CUnvMAL STATUTE-INSTUCTIONS TO JURIES.
Defendant was convicted of storehouse breaking and his punishment
fixed at imprisonment for life under the Habitual Criminal Statute.1
IKy. Rev. Stat. § 431.190 (1959).
Conviction of felony; punishment on second and third offenses ...
if convicted a third time of felony, he shall be confined in the pen-
itentiary during his life. Judgment in such cases shall not be given
for the increased penalty unless the jury finds, from the record and
other competent evidence, the fact of former convictions for felony
committed by the prisoner, in or out of this state. (Emphasis added.)
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Defendant appealed on the ground that certain instructions given
the jury were prejudicially erroneous. Instruction No. 1 submitted the
question of defendant's guilt of storehouse breaking in the usual form
and provided a penalty of not less than one nor more than five years
imprisonment if the jury found defendant guilty of this charge. In
substance, Instruction No. 5 provided that if the jury found the de-
fendant guilty under Instruction No. 1, and should further believe
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he had been con-
victed of felonies on two previous consecutive occasions, the jury
"will" fix his punishment at confinement for life. The basis of de-
fendant's objection was that Instruction No. 5 deprived the jury of its
discretionary right to fix defendant's punishment for the single offense
of storehouse breaking as prescribed by Instruction No. 1. Held:
Affirmed. The instructions were not prejudicially erroneous. Hamm v.
Commonwealth, 300 S.W. 2d 562 (Ky. 1957).
The court reasoned to the following effect: The instructions cor-
rectly stated the law under the Habitual Criminal Statute because the
statute mandatorily directs that "any person convicted . . . a third
time of felony . . . shall be confined in the penitentiary during his
life."2 (Emphasis added.) Further, the jury was not deprived of the
discretion to fix defendant's punishment as that prescribed for store-
house breaking since a term of punishment for that offense was set
out in Instruction No. 1.
The point for comment in the principal case is as follows: Con-
sidered in the context of previous decisions in point, what is the
existing state of the law in Kentucky regarding the "discretion" which
a jury has in imposing, or declining to impose, upon a defendant
the provisions of the Habitual Criminal Statute?
In order to reach some conclusion as to the state of the law in this
regard, let us first look at the case background underlying the prin-
cipal case. In 1939 the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided two cases
in point, and these cases were relied on by appellant in the principal
case. In Coleman v. Commonwealth,3 the lower court gave instruc-
tion which failed to provide a penalty for the principal offense charged
but provided that if the jury found the defendant guilty of the prin-
cipal offense and further found that he had been twice previously
convicted of felonies, they should give him life. On appeal, the court
said this constituted reversible error since the jury was provided no
opportunity to convict for the single offense alone. The court could
have simply said that in the event the jury did not find from the
evidence the fact of two previous convictions of felonies the jury had
2 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 431.190 (1959).
3 276 Ky. 802, 125 S.W. 2d 728 (1939).
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no instruction under which they could convict for the principal
offense. But instead the court said, in substance, that even if the
jury had found the defendant guilty of the principal offense and that
he had been twice previously convicted of felonies the jury still had
discretion to prescribe only the penalty for the principal offense.
The court pointed out that the jury might disregard the former con-
victions because they deemed the principal crime not to merit the
severe punishment provided by the Habitual Criminal Statute, or
that the character of the defendant himself did not justify it.
In Allen v. Commonwealth,4 the court below also failed to provide,
in its instruction to the jury, a penalty for the single offense for which
the defendant was charged. On appeal, the court likewise reversed
for this omission and reaffrmed the language of the Coleman case.
In 1955, the court, in Green. v. Commonwealth,5 apparently
limited the broad language of the Coleman and Allen cases. The
instructions given the jury in the Green case were essentially like
those of the principal case in that one paragraph set out the punish-
ment for the single offense and a later paragraph directed the jury
to punish under the Habitual Criminal Statute if they found the de-
fendant guilty of the single offense and also found the fact of a for-
mer conviction.6 The court said that in the Coleman and Allen cases
the jury could only find the defendant guilty under the Habitual
Criminal Statute or acquit, but in the Green case the jury was at
liberty to convict under either the Habitual Criminal Statute or
under the instruction for the single offense.
The court in the principal case used Green v. Commonwealth to
distinguish the principal case. from the Coleman and Allen cases.
The conclusion which appears to follow from the above decisions
is that the court feels the instructions must be worded in accordance
with the mandatory language of the Habitual Criminal Statute, but
at the same time tactily recognizes that the jury still has "discretion"
under these instructions to convict for the single offense or to impose a
life sentence, so long as a penalty for the single offense was provided
along with the penalty under the Habitual Criminal Statute. This
"discretion" is apparently predicated on the idea that the jury could
ignore the mandatory language of the instructions and only convict
under the instructions relating to the single offense.
One may feel that a statute which is directory rather than man-
datory, i.e., provides that jury "may" instead of "shall" give life, is
4 277 Ky 168 125 S.W. 2d 1013 (1939).
5 281 S.W. 2a 637 (Ky. 1955).
6 In this case the defendant was being tried under that portion of Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 431.190 which provides for an increased punishment on conviction for a
second felony.
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more in keeping with fundamental justice,7 as expressed in the Cole-
man case. But the court in the principal case was faced with the
practical fact that the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Statute is man-
datorily worded. The court conceded the wording of the statute,
but apparently has recognized that under the Kentucky system of
pronouncing sentence in criminal cases8 the jury could, as a matter
of fact, ignore the instructions in relation to the Habitual Criminal
Statute and convict and sentence for the single offense only. Since the
Commonwealth cannot appeal from such a verdict,9 the jury has, in
effect, exercised some discretion as to the amount of punishment
assessed.
It is submitted that this situation leaves something to be desired.
Many juries will not be strong-willed enough to ignore the instruc-
tions given them by the court and will return a verdict for a life
sentence in an instance where they would have given a lesser sen-
tence under directory instructions because of the special circum-
stances surrounding the case.
Arthur L. Brooks, Jr.
Dom~snc RELATIONS-RESTORATION OF PROPERTY VERsus LuMP Sum
AinioN-Appellee (husband) was granted a divorce in 1956 in an
action in which appellant (wife) counterclaimed for divorce, award
of alimony, and restoration of property. Property acquired during
the marriage included substantial interests in two successful busi-
nesses with an estimated value of almost $200,000, a residence which
with improvements had cost $18,000, an automobile, household
effects, and other miscellaneous personal property. Appellant had
been gainfully employed for 13 of the 16 years of marriage and had
deposited her earnings in a joint bank account. The interest in the
first of the two businesses was purchased with a $5,000 down pay-
ment and deferred payments which were made out of earnings of
the business. Of the $5,000 down payment $1,000 was borrowed from
appellants family and repaid out of business earnings. The $4,000
of the parties' own funds was made up from $3,497.04 of appellants
7 That is, the principal offense might not be of such magnitude to merit the
severe punishment of the statute; or the particular circumstances surrounding the
case, or the character of the defendant may be mitigating factors. Also see Hall
v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 894, 51 S.W. 814 (1899), for further argument along
this line.
8Under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 431.130 (1959), the jury "shall fix by its verdict a
punishment to be inflicted within the periods or amounts prescribed by law .. "
But compare the system of allowing the jury to only find the fact, and the court
to set the punishment in light of the jury's finding.
9The Commonwealth may not appeal to affect the defendant but only for
the purpose of settling the law on a point. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tam Tuyl,
58 Ky. (1 Met.) 1 (1858).
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